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Abstract
This study investigated responses to near-wins (i.e., nonwin outcomes that were close to a major win, and their
counterpart, near-losses (nonwin outcomes that are proximal to a major loss) in a decision-making task, measuring (a)
luck ratings, (b) adjustment of bet amount, and (c) facial muscle reactivity at zygomaticus and corrugator sites. Compared
to full-misses, near-wins decreased self-perceived luck and near-losses increased self-perceived luck, consistent with the
effects of upward versus downward counterfactual thinking, respectively. Wins and losses both increased zygomaticus
reactivity, and losses selectively enhanced corrugator reactivity. Near-wins heightened zygomaticus activity, but did not
affect corrugator activity, thus showing a similar response pattern to actual wins. There were no significant facial EMG
effects of near-losses.We infer that near-wins engender some appetitive processing, despite their objective nonwin status.
Descriptors: Electromyography, Risk taking, Cognitive distortion, Near-miss, Gambling
Gambling is a widespread form of entertainment where a monetary
wager is placed upon the uncertain prospect of a larger monetary
win. Its allure can provide insight into the psychological mecha-
nisms of human decision making. Previous research has shown that
near-wins—nonwin outcomes that are proximal to a jackpot—foster
persistent play (Côté, Caron, Aubert, Desrochers, & Ladouceur,
2003, Kassinove & Schare, 2001) and increase motivational ratings
(Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, & Gray, 2009). Slot machine near-
wins were perceived as being “closer” to wins than to losses
(Dymond et al., 2014). Using functional magnetic resonance
imaging, near-winswere also found to increase neural signal in brain
reward circuitry that overlapped with the jackpot wins (Chase &
Clark, 2010; Clark et al., 2009). Nevertheless, near-wins also have a
negative emotional component; for example, they are rated as sig-
nificantly less pleasant than full-miss outcomes (Clark, 2010; Clark
et al., 2009, 2013; Qi, Ding, Song, & Yang, 2011).
Psychophysiology may provide a useful tool for further char-
acterizing the bivalent emotional response to these events. Past
work has shown that near-wins increase electrodermal activity
(EDA) and heart rate acceleration, in comparison to full-miss out-
comes (Clark, Crooks, Clarke, Aitken, & Dunn, 2012; Clark et al.,
2013; Dixon et al., 2011). EDA is a sensitive marker of physiologi-
cal arousal that responds to both aversive and appetitive stimuli,
and thus offers limited valence specificity (Dawson, Schell, &
Filion, 2007; Lobbestael, Arntz, & Wiers, 2008). Phasic heart rate
changes do show some differences by valence (e.g., Bradley,
Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001), but this is a complex mul-
tiphasic response that also varies across individuals (Hodes, Cook,
& Lang, 1985). Facial muscle activity offers an alternative probe of
stimulus-evoked emotional reactivity with superior valence differ-
entiation, with zygomaticus activity (recorded on the cheek) linked
to appetitive processing, and corrugator supercilii activity (rec-
orded on the eyebrow) scaling with aversive processing (Cacioppo,
Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm,
1993). The present study employed facial electromyography
(EMG) at these two sites to better decompose the bivalent emo-
tional nature of gambling “near” events.
Little attention has been paid to the natural counterpart to the
near-win, the “near-loss.” In a decision with the possibility of
losing money, what happens if you discover that you narrowly
missed a major loss? While these events are less ubiquitous in
gambling behavior, they do occur across many areas of day-to-day
decision making, for example, when we narrowly miss an accident,
or traffic jam, and they have received some attention in occupa-
tional psychology. For example, narrowly avoiding a great disaster
lowered the future perceived risk of that event occurring, and
increased risky choice (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008). The present study
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sought to model these events in a gambling situation, by developing
a wheel of fortune task in order to deliver both near-wins versus
near-losses in the same environment. Our design was based upon a
“single-shot” game by Wohl and Enzle (2003) in which partici-
pants experiencing a near-loss were more likely to bet on a second
risky prospect. In order to quantify psychophysiological reactivity
to the gambling outcomes (as well as behavioral measures), we
developed a multishot version of their procedure.
The impact of these near events may be understood from the
perspective of counterfactual thinking, the mental processes by
which people consider salient alternatives to events that actually
occurred (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese, 1997; Zhang & Covey,
2014). Counterfactual thinking is seen to amplify emotional
responses, and impacts upon behavioral regulation (see Epstude &
Roese, 2008, for a review). In considering the counterfactual
thoughts associated with near events, it is important to distinguish
two types: upward counterfactuals involve unobtained outcomes
that are better than what actually happened, whereas downward
counterfactuals involve unobtained outcomes that are worse than
reality (Roese, 1997). These directions may have distinct effects on
emotional responses.While upward counterfactual thinking is asso-
ciated with a state of regret and negative affect, downward
counterfactuals tend to elicit relief and positive affect (Roese, 1994).
As well as the counterfactual direction, outcome closeness is a
further determinant of counterfactually driven emotions
(Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992). In a scenario from
Kahneman and Tversky (1982), participants indicated that Traveler
A, who missed his flight by 5 min, would feel more upset than
Traveler B, who missed his flight by 30 min. Thus, emotional
reactions to a negative outcome may be intensified if the distance
between the unobtained and obtained outcomes is close. To quan-
tify these putative counterfactual thoughts to near-wins and near-
losses in our gambling task, we administered trial-by-trial luck
ratings. Perceptions of luckiness were shown previously to be
sensitive to close counterfactuals (Teigen, 1995, 1996).We hypoth-
esized that, compared to full-misses, near-losses would activate
downward counterfactuals, and make individuals feel luckier. On
the other hand, we expected that near-wins would elicit upward
counterfactuals, and make people feel unlucky. To check our
manipulation and to corroborate the counterfactual nature of these
effects, we administered a questionnaire after participants com-
pleted the task, where we used screenshots of the different out-
comes to ask about their first thoughts as to how the outcome could
have been different (see also Wohl & Enzle, 2003).
As a second metric reflecting behavioral choice, participants
also selected a bet on each trial. This enabled us to investigate the
effects of near-wins and near-losses on subsequent gambling
behavior. Darke and Freedman (1997a) found that the experience
of a lucky event could make individuals feel more confident and bet
more on a subsequent gamble, and that these effects were further
moderated by the trait level of belief in luck. Priming participants
with luck-related concepts also enhanced perceived luckiness and
increased risky decision making (Jiang, Cho, & Adaval, 2009). In
the present study, we reasoned that if near-wins and near-losses
could influence self-perceived luck via counterfactual thinking,
then this may modify risk-taking behavior on the subsequent trial.
Specifically, we hypothesized that increased luck perceptions fol-
lowing near-losses would make individuals bet more in the follow-
ing round, whereas decreased luckiness after a near-win would
make individuals bet less. However, as previous research has
shown that near-misses (i.e., near-wins) increased self-reported
motivation to play (Clark et al., 2009, 2013), it is also possible that
the appetitive aspect of near-wins could be manifested in an
increased bet in the subsequent gamble.
Our predictions for the facial muscle reactivity were somewhat
exploratory, given that only one prior study to our knowledge has
examined facial EMG activity to gambling outcomes. Bediou,
Mohri, Lack, and Sander (2011) found that, in the context of a
competition task involving third-party arbitration decisions, large
wins were associated with increased zygomaticus activity com-
pared to large losses. Past work with a range of emotional stimuli
shows corrugator responsivity to negative affect (Cacioppo et al.,
1986; Lang et al., 1993), which we expected to generalize to finan-
cial losses. As such, we had a strong a priori hypothesis for the
objective win and loss outcomes that wins would enhance
zygomaticus activity, whereas losses would enhance corrugator
activity. As emotionally complex events, we reasoned that near-
wins would elicit aversive processing that would increase
corrugator reactivity, and/or motivational processing that would
increase zygomaticus activity. For near-losses, we predicted that
the positive emotions associated with self-perceived luckiness
would heighten zygomaticus activity as well.
Method
Participants
We recruited 45 healthy volunteers (25 men; mean age = 24.5,
SD = 3.2) from the student population at the University of Cam-
bridge for a study of gambling behavior.We determined this sample
size based on previous facial EMG studies (Carr, Winkielman, &
Oveis, 2013; Larsen, Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003). Our recruitment
strategy excluded psychology and economics students, and was
directed towards studentswith some interest in gambling by using an
advertisement that asked, “Do you enjoy gambling?” At the end of
the test session, participants completed three self-report instru-
ments: (1) the gambling related cognitions scale (GRCS; Raylu &
Oei, 2004) as an index of the trait susceptibility to gambling cogni-
tions, and this scale indicated moderate levels of gambling involve-
ment (M = 44.0, SD = 14.3, range 23–81) in the range of previous
studies in recreational gamblers (Billieux, Van der Linden, Khazaal,
Zullino, & Clark, 2012; Raylu & Oei, 2004); (2) the problem
gambling severity index (Ferris & Wynne, 2001) to screen for
problem gambling; no participants met the threshold for problem
gambling (score ≥ 8; M = 0.53, SD = 0.94); (3) the belief in good
luck scale (BIGL; Darke & Freedman, 1997b) to measure trait
beliefs in luck. The study was conducted in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the University of
Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee. Written
informed consent was obtained from all participants. Volunteers
attended individual testing sessions of 2-h duration, where they
completed a computerized wheel of fortune task, with concurrent
recording of facial EMG. All participants were paid the maximum
possible win of £25 (approximately $37.80) as their reimbursement.
Wheel of Fortune Task
Participants completed 120 experimental trials on a computerized
wheel of fortune task modified from Wohl and Enzle (2003; see
Figure 1), and programmed using Presentation software
(Neurobehavioral System Inc.). On each trial, thewheel was divided
into eight segments of different colors. The + or − symbols in each
segment indicated the amounts the participant stood to win or lose.
Segments without any symbols represented zero outcomes (neither
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win nor lose). The number (e.g., 10) indicated the size ofwin/loss, as
amultiplier of the amount that the participant bet1 on each round. For
instance, +10× meant that the participant would win 10 times the
wager, and −10× meant that he/she would lose 10 times the wager.
The specific trial timings were as follows (see Figure 1). At the
beginning of each trial, the participant was asked to choose a bet
between £0.10 and £0.90, in £0.10 increments. Following bet selec-
tion, the wheel spun for an anticipation interval (2–6.5 s), during
which time the wheel decelerated to a standstill. The outcome
phase then lasted 3 s, where the segment was highlighted, and there
was accompanying auditory feedback (applause for winning out-
comes, booing for losing outcomes, or neutral sounds for null
outcomes), and the numeric outcome was displayed for 1 s. Fol-
lowing the outcome phase, a luck rating was displayed using a
9-point visual analogue scale (“How lucky did you feel?” with 1
indicating extremely unlucky and 9 indicating extremely lucky). No
time constraints were imposed on bet selection or luck ratings.
During a variable intertrial interval (8–12 s), only a fixation cross
was displayed, to allow for recovery of physiological signals.
Three different wheel types were presented to manipulate the
outcome, in a pseudorandomized sequence. The key wheel of inter-
est contained both win (+10×) and loss segments (−10×), thus
offering a neutral expected value. The other twowheel types offered
only a win or loss segment (and therefore the possibility of deliver-
ing only near-wins and full-misses, or near-losses and full-misses,
respectively), generating a positive and negative expected value on
those wheels. These were included in order that participants should
vary their bet on a trial-by-trial basis (see the results in the online
supporting information). The outcomes were fair, such that each
segmentwas selected five times,withwins and losses on one in eight
trials (12.5%), and near-wins, near-losses, and full-misses each
occurring on two in eight trials (25%). Near-wins were zero out-
comes in the segment either side of the win. Similarly, near-losses
were zero outcomes in the segment either side of the loss. Both near
events were compared against a baseline of “full-misses,” where the
highlighted null segment was not adjacent to either the win or loss
segment.An equal number of near-wins and near-losses were deliv-
ered on either side of the win and loss, respectively.
Following the gambling task, participants viewed screenshots
of near-wins that stopped before and after the winning segment,
and near-losses that stopped before and after the losing segment.
For each screenshot, they were asked to list their first thought about
how the outcome could have been different.
Facial EMG Measurement
Facial EMG data were collected via a BIOPAC (Santa Barbara,
CA) MP36R, recording at 1,000 samples per second. The BIOPAC
was connected to a stimulus delivery computer and a second
administrator computer runningAcqknowledge v4.1. Events occur-
ring on the stimulus delivery computer (including the outcomes on
the task) were synchronized to the facial EMG recording using
digital channels. Facial EMG recordings were collected through
4-mm shielded chloride electrodes attached to the skin over the left
eye (i.e., corrugator) and left cheek (i.e., zygomaticus muscles) via
4-mm adhesive disks, according to the standard procedures estab-
lished previously (Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986). Following attach-
ment of fEMG electrodes, 5 min of resting state data were
acquired, before the instructions for the wheel of fortune task were
read to the participant.
1. This is a slightly unorthodox form of “bet” where, on the null
outcome, the wager was effectively returned to the subject. That is to say,
the bet only served as a multiplier on actual win or loss outcomes.
Figure 1. Sequence of events in a single trial. The arrow on the outcome phase indicates the direction of movement. This trial displays a near-win that has
passed through the payline.
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Data Processing and Analysis
Data were screened prior to analysis and resampled at 100 Hz. The
raw fEMG data, recorded at 5–500 Hz, were extracted using an
inhouse script programmed inRStudio (RDevelopmentCoreTeam,
2008). The data were filtered through a 30 Hz high-pass filter to
remove low frequency noise and artifacts recorded during the task.
The filtered data were then rectified, converting negative values into
positive values. Mean values were extracted for a baseline period in
the final 2 s of the spin, and for 4 s following the wheel stopping (the
outcome). Percentage change from baselines was calculated, in
order to compare activity at the two muscle locations.
For the behavioral data, we used R and nlme (Pinheiro, Bates,
DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Development Core Team, 2013) to perform a
linear mixed effects analysis on the two main dependent variables:
(1) luck ratings, (2) the change in the bet amount from the current
trial, n, to the next trial, n + 1. We use linear mixed effects (LME)
modeling via restricted maximum likelihood for all repeated meas-
ures analyses to reduce information loss when evaluating large,
unbalanced data sets after signal standardization (Carr et al., 2013;
Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012). As a random effect, we had an
intercept representing participant number. For each dependent vari-
able, we ran three separate models. In the first model, we assessed
the impact of the objective outcomes as a fixed effect, with three
levels to compare wins, losses, and null outcomes. In the second
model, we compared the three types of null outcomes (i.e., near-
wins, near-losses, and full-misses). In the third model, we consid-
ered near-miss type (i.e., near-win, near-loss) as well as its position
(i.e., whether the segment stopped just before or passing through
the win/loss segment), treating both factors as fixed effects (with
interaction terms). Visual inspection of residual plots did not reveal
any obvious deviations from homoskedasticity or normality. For all
the models on luck ratings, the bet amount at the start of the current
trial (i.e., before the outcome was delivered) was entered as a fixed
factor of no interest. To assess the validity of the mixed effects
analyses, we performed likelihood ratio tests comparing the models
with fixed effects to the null models with only the random effects.
We rejected results in which the model including fixed effects did
not differ significantly from the null model.
For the facial EMG data, we averaged the raw data under each
experimental condition. The LME model was used with participant
number entered as a random effect factor, using the equivalent three
sets of models to the behavioral data.
Results
Manipulation Check
We coded the counterfactual statements given by the participants as
+1 for an upward counterfactual (e.g., “I could have won a lot of
money”), 0 for no counterfactual (“I don’t mind”), −1 for a down-
ward counterfactual (e.g., “I could have lost 10 times the amount I
bet”; based upon Wohl & Enzle, 2003). These were coded by two
independent judges who were blind to the purpose of the study, and
interrater agreement rate was 100%. A 2 (Type: near-wins vs.
near-losses) × 2 (Position: before vs. after segment) repeated meas-
ures analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant main
effect of near-miss type, F(1,44) = 241.76, p < .001, ηp2 85= . .
Near-wins elicited upward counterfactuals, M = 0.70, SD = 0.42,
whereas near-losses elicited downward counterfactuals,M = −0.82,
SD = 0.32. Neither the main effect of near-miss position nor the
interaction term were statistically reliable, both F(1,44) < 1.
Luck Ratings
The first model assessed the impact of the different objective out-
comes (three levels: win vs. loss vs. null) on the luck ratings (see
Table 1). There was a significant main effect of outcome type,
χ2(2) = 146.12, p < .001, with participants feeling luckier follow-
ing wins compared to null outcomes, b = 1.93, t(88) = 7.61,
p < .001, and following null outcomes compared to losses,
b = −2.31, t(88) = −9.12, p < .001.
The second model compared the three types of null outcomes
(i.e., near-wins vs. near-losses vs. full-misses; see Table 2). There
was a significant main effect of outcome type, χ2(2) = 30.13,
p < .001. Near-losses significantly increased luck ratings relative to
full-misses, b = 0.29, t(88) = 2.91, p < .01. Conversely, luck ratings
were lower following near-wins compared to full-misses,
b = −0.31, t(88) = −3.06, p < .01.
The near-loss effect was further moderated by the trait level of
beliefs in luck, on the BIGL scale. The BIGL score was positively
correlated with the increase in luck ratings following a near-loss
compared to a full-miss, r = 0.37, p = .01. The BIGL score did not
predict the luck ratings following full-misses, r = −.22, p > .1, or
the decrease after near-wins compared to full-misses, r = −.20,
p > .1. GRCS scores were moderately correlated with the BIGL
scores (Darke & Freedman, 1997b), r = .39, p < .01, and with the
trial-by-trial luck ratings averaged across all the experimental con-
ditions, r = .34, p < .05, but the GRCS scores did not predict the
luck ratings in any single experimental condition (e.g., near-wins or
near-losses, ps > .1).
The third model decomposed the four types of near-misses by
near-miss type (near-wins vs. near-losses) and near-miss position
(before vs. after). The main effect of near-miss type was already
established in the second model, and, similar to the manipulation
check for counterfactual thinking, neither the main effect of near-
miss position nor the interaction term reached significance, both
χ2(1) < 1.
Bet Amount Change
In the first model looking at the objective outcomes (see Table 1),
there was a significant main effect of outcome type, χ2(2) = 11.23,
p < .01, with participants reducing their bet following wins, com-
pared to both null outcomes, b = −4.67, t = −2.49, p = .01, and
losses, b = −6.04, t = −3.23, p < .01.
Table 1. Behavioral Responses to the Objective Gains and Losses
on the Wheel of Fortune Task [Mean (SD)]
Win Loss Null
Luck rating 6.88 (1.27) 2.62 (1.68) 4.95 (0.63)
Betting amount change −4.84 (12.06) −0.18 (9.23) 1.20 (2.41)
Table 2. Behavioral Responses to the Null Outcomes, Comparing
the Near Events Against Full-Misses [Mean (SD)]
Near-wins Near-losses Full-misses
Luck rating 4.65 (0.81) 5.24 (0.72) 4.95 (0.69)
Betting amount change 1.89 (5.89) 0.78 (5.25) 0.93 (3.91)
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In the second model (see Table 2), there were no differences in
betting behavior following the different types of null outcome,
χ2(2) = 1.28, p > .1. Given this result, the third model decomposing
the null events by position was not run on betting behavior.
Facial EMG
Zygomaticus reactivity. The first model assessing the objective
outcomes (see Figure 2A) yielded a marginally significant main
effect, χ2(2) = 4.45, p = .1, which was driven by losses
(M = 12.34%, SD = 40.65%) significantly increasing zygomaticus
reactivity compared to null outcomes (M = 1.79%, SD = 4.99%),
b = 10.55%, t(88) = 2.11, p < .05. An a priori test comparing
zygomaticus activity following wins (M = 7.55%, SD = 19.53%)
and null outcomes confirmed a significant response to wins,
χ2(1) = 5.82, p = .01. There was no difference between wins versus
losses, b = −4.79%, t(44) = −0.81, p > .1.
The second model tested for differences between three types of
null outcomes (see Figure 2B). There was a significant main effect
of outcome type, χ2(2) = 5.70, p = .05, with near-wins (M = 3.50%,
SD = 2.87%) eliciting higher zygomaticus activity than both near-
losses (M = 0.96%, SD = 10.06%), b = 2.54%, t(88) = 2.05,
p < .05, and full-misses (M = 0.90%, SD = 5.83%), b = 2.60%,
t(88) = 2.10, p < .05.
The third model confirmed the main effect of near-miss type in
model 2, but neither the main effect of near-miss position,
χ2(1) = 0.21, p > .1, nor the interaction term, χ2(1) = 0.007, p > .1,
was significant.
Corrugator reactivity. In the first model looking at the objective
outcomes (see Figure 2C), we found a marginally significant
main effect of outcome type, χ2(2) = 4.50, p = .10, driven by
losses (M = 5.16%, SD = 36.37%) significantly increasing
corrugator reactivity relative to wins (M = −3.98%,
Figure 2. A: Zygomaticus reactivity to the objective gains and losses. B: Zygomaticus reactivity to the null outcomes, comparing the near events against
full-misses C: Corrugator reactivity to the objective gains and losses. D: Corrugator reactivity to the null outcomes, comparing the near events against
full-misses. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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SD = 10.88%), b = 9.14%, t(88) = 2.02, p < .05, consistent with
our a priori prediction.
In the second model (see Figure 2D), there was no statistically
reliable main effect of the null event type (near-wins:M = −0.90%,
SD = 12.82%; near-losses: M = −2.65%, SD = 8.07%; full-misses:
M = −2.35%, SD = 6.13%), χ2(2) = 1.67, p > .1, and therefore the
third model further decomposing near events by position was not
performed.
Thus, both objective wins and losses increased zygomaticus
activity, whereas corrugator activity was selectively sensitive to
losses. Near-wins increased zygomaticus but not corrugator activ-
ity, thereby showing a similar pattern to the actual wins. As a direct
test of the similar profile, we ran a supplementary model to
compare near-wins, objective wins, and objective losses. For the
zygomaticus, near-wins and wins did not differ from each other,
b = 4.79%, t(88) = 1.03, p > .1, and losses elicited stronger
responses compared to near-wins, b = 8.84%, t(88) = 2.05, p < .05.
For the corrugator, there was no difference between wins and
near-wins, b = 3.08%, t(88) = 0.83, p > .1, and losses elicited
greater responses compared to both objective wins, b = 9.14%,
t(88) = 2.19, p < .05, and at trend, near-wins, b = 6.06%,
t(88) = 1.63, p = .1.
Discussion
By using a wheel of fortune task, the present study investigated the
effects of near-wins and near-losses on self-perceived luck, betting
behavior, and facial muscle reactivity. Subjectively, participants
reported greater feelings of luckiness following near-losses, rela-
tive to full-misses, and this effect was further correlated with the
trait beliefs in luck using Darke and Freedman’s BIGL scale. Near-
wins exerted the opposite effect on luck ratings, decreasing self-
reported luck. While this effect did not scale with BIGL score, it is
notable that the BIGL selectively assays positive aspects of luck.
Betting behavior was primarily sensitive to the objective outcomes
on the task, with participants reducing the amount of the bet fol-
lowing wins. Near-wins and near-losses had no significant influ-
ence on this adjustment in betting behavior in the next round of the
game.
Our facial EMG data provide an important proof-of-principle
demonstration for the differential sensitivities of zygomaticus and
corrugator. Zygomaticus activity increased after objective wins and
losses, whereas corrugator activity selectively increased following
objective losses. Near-win outcomes significantly increased
zygomaticus activity, relative to both full-misses and near-losses,
but did not affect corrugator response, thus showing a similar
response pattern as actual wins. This interpretation was confirmed
in a model that directly compared objective wins and losses against
near-wins.
Previous facial EMG research indicates that zygomaticus activ-
ity is a sensitive marker of appetitive processing (Cacioppo et al.,
1986; Lang et al., 1993) and that corrugator activity is sensitive to
aversive processing (Lang et al., 1993; Larsen et al., 2003). Thus, a
simple interpretation of the zygomaticus reactivity to near-wins is
that this reflects the appetitive nature of nearly winning, consistent
with prior studies taking motivational ratings (Clark et al., 2009)
and measurements of play duration (Côté et al., 2003; Kassinove &
Schare, 2001). However, this interpretation is complicated by our
observation that zygomaticus activity also increased following
losses. We note that some past work has described zygomaticus
activity to affective images varying as a quadratic function with
emotional valence, such that both intensely positive and negative
stimuli can enhance zygomaticus activity (Lang et al., 1993;
Larsen et al., 2003). Critically, negative emotional stimuli also
elicit a reliable effect on the corrugator, which was seen for objec-
tive losses in the present study but not for near-wins or objective
wins. Thus, the combined pattern across the two sites for near-wins
in the present study is most consistent with an appetitive signal—
that near-wins engender some of the appetitive processing associ-
ated with actual wins.
The finding that near-losses increased luck ratings relative to
full-misses corroborates Wohl and Enzle’s (2003) finding that near-
losses heightened perception of personal luck. Using a one-trial
task with a subsequent risk decision on a different gamble, Wohl
and Enzle (2003) observed no significant effect of near-wins,
whereas in the current multishot task the effects of near-wins on
luck perceptions mirrored the effects of near-losses (i.e., lower luck
ratings after near-wins). It has been shown that emotional
responses following counterfactual thinking are affected by the
direction of the counterfactuals (Markman & McMullen, 2003;
Roese, 1994). While comparing reality to a more desirable alter-
native can elicit more negative emotions (i.e., upward
counterfactuals), comparing reality to a less desirable alternative
can elicit more positive emotions (i.e., downward counterfactuals).
Moreover, the counterfactual thinking is more likely to be mentally
constructed when the reality and its alternative are in short distance
(the “simulation heuristic”). This proximity could be of spatial
(Johnson, 1986; Miller & McFarland, 1986), temporal (Macrae,
Milne, & Griffiths, 1993), or numeric form (Medvec, Madey, &
Gilovich, 1995; Medvec & Savitsky, 1997). Therefore, in the
present study, being close to desirable but unrealized wins could
encourage people to compare the reality to what could have been
better (i.e., upward counterfactual comparison), as confirmed by
the manipulation check, and this would make individuals feel
unlucky. As suggested by previous near-miss research (Clark et al.,
2009, 2013), this would elicit negative emotions such as frustration
and disappointment. On the other hand, being close to an undesir-
able but averted loss could encourage people to compare the reality
to what could have been worse (i.e., downward counterfactual
comparison), as confirmed by the manipulation check, and this
would make people feel luckier and give rise to positive emotions
such as relief.
In betting behavior, we primarily observed an adjustment of
betting following the objective outcomes: betting was reduced on
trials following major wins compared to the other objective
outcome types. This effect is consistent with a broad definition of
the gambler’s fallacy that people do not expect runs of consecutive
identical outcomes (in this case, wins) in a random task (Ayton &
Fischer, 2004). Sundali and Croson (2006) refer to this as the
“stock of luck” belief, that good luck is exhaustible, and therefore
people may strategically reduce their bet following wins given a
perceived reduction in the probability of winning on the next trial.
In the present study, this effect was asymmetrical, with no corre-
sponding increase in betting observed following losses.
Despite the marked adjustment of betting following wins, we
did not observe any reliable change in betting following near-wins
or near-losses. As such, our results do not replicate Wohl and Enzle
(2003), who reported increased wagering in a group who experi-
enced near-losses, compared to a group who experienced near-
wins. There are several pertinent methodological differences that
may account for the discrepancy: Wohl and Enzle’s (2003) study
involved single rounds of two different gambling tasks, whereas we
employed a multishot version of a single gambling task, in which
learning and habituation may reduce carryover effects of near
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events on subsequent risk taking. Another study using scenarios
also found that narrowly avoiding a disaster (i.e., a near-loss)
reduced people’s risk perceptions, and increased subsequent risky
choices (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008).
In the present study, we did not find any position effects of near
events either side of the win/loss segment, either on subjective luck
ratings or on facial muscle reactivity. Using a slot machine simu-
lation, Clark et al. (2013) previously observed that the motivational
effect of near-wins was restricted to those events that stopped
before the payline, whereas near-wins after the payline were pri-
marily aversive (but see Wohl & Enzle, 2003 Experiment 2). These
differences are compatible with theories of counterfactual thinking
(Markman & McMullen, 2003), but may be somewhat fragile and
depend upon the precise temporal dynamics of the anticipatory
period, or differential sensitivities of the luck rating as the depend-
ent variable here. One limitation of the present study is that the luck
rating and bet adjustment variables do not map directly to the
ratings of pleasantness and motivation used in some past work. Our
results also failed to corroborate a previous study by Bediou et al.
(2011) in which zygomaticus activity was greater following gains
relative to losses. In our study, financial losses also elicited
zygomaticus activity. We note that the Bediou et al. (2011) experi-
ment used a social competition task, and also did not include null
financial outcomes as a baseline.We would encourage further work
recording facial EMG during tasks of economic decision making.
To our knowledge, this is the first study using facial EMG to
investigate near-miss effects in a laboratory setting. Zygomaticus
was sensitive to objective wins and losses, whereas corrugator was
only sensitive to objective losses. Near-wins were perceived as
unlucky, but heightened zygomaticus activity, showing a similar
facial muscle response pattern as actual wins. This is consistent
with previous literature showing the bivalent emotional nature of
near-wins. This supports the utility of facial EMG as a marker of
emotional reactivity in gambling and decision-making research.
Near-wins and near-losses elicited downward and upward
counterfactuals, respectively, and drove luck perceptions in oppos-
ing directions, which emphasizes the role of counterfactual think-
ing in the near-miss effect.
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